- UFO on orbit of the Sun - hiding the truth.
- ALL SPACE ONLINE
- Monitoring of the Sun - Online.
- World hoax scientists and NASA - Sun critical condition!
- Mars - Secrets and Hiding NASA.
- Secrets of the lunar mission of NASA "GRAIL"
- Russian documentaries about UFOs and secret materials of the planet Earth. (Very interesting!)
- UFO Research near the Sun and Moon! NASA Hiding!
- APP FREE! Monitoring of UFO activity in 24 hours.
- Sensational investigation! Pass nine dead. Report ...
- Breaking news! Full deciphering of the alien signal WOW - 6EQUJ5 !!! 2016.
- Crop Circles - decrypting messages.
- Sensational investigation! Mystery, flown away from the plane Amelia Earhart. 2016.
- Flat Earth - Proof: Russian documents
- Sensational investigation! The battleship Novoross...
- MISSILE FOR THE POLE: Investigation 2017
- Sensational investigation! Established the circums...
Friday, April 14, 2017
Sensational investigation! The battleship Novorossiysk ruined treason. April 2017
Ships, like people, are born, live and die. To one ship the fate gives the chance to live to deep old age and to end its existence on scrapping for scrap metal under the merciless flame of the cutter. The other is prepared for premature death, which occurs for a variety of random or non-random reasons. The life of the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare broke off at the 42nd year of his service, on a dark and cold October night of 1955 in the raid of Sevastopol Bay, far from his beloved sunny and warm Italy. His fate by this time was such that he was part of the Black Sea Navy, and at the time of his death for more than six years he walked through the expanses of the Black Sea under the strange name of Novorossiysk, which he did not understand.
The last hours of life of this battleship are most fully described in BA's documentary historical chronicle. Karzhavin "The mystery of the death of the battleship" Novorossiysk ". The book presents a large amount of archival material for the investigation of the disaster, including a survey of survivors of that tragedy of sailors and officers, testimony of representatives of the High Command of the Black Sea Fleet, opinions and opinions of experts and experts of various profiles, including divers, who conducted a survey of the ship's hull and bottom of the bay The place of his death. There are also entries from the watch logs of the ships that were stationed in the Sevastopol Bay on the night of the tragedy, extracts from the current events logs of the Black Sea Fleet operational duty officer and the operative duty officer of the division for the protection of the Sevastopol Bay water area. The material collected by this researcher allows us to objectively assess the situation in the bay on the eve of the catastrophe, to recreate the dynamics of the development of dramatic events and come to the conclusion about the most probable cause of the nocturnal explosion and the conditions that made this explosion possible.
BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF THE SHIP.
The Italian battleship "Giulio Cesare" was laid in 1910, launched in 1911, enlisted in the Navy of Italy in 1913. In 1915 the ship took part in the First World War on the side France and England. With the arrival in Italy of B. Mussolini (Benito Amilсare Andrea Mussolini), the ship underwent a modernization, during which the firepower of the main caliber increased, the armor protection of the battleship increased slightly, and the power of its new powerplants allowed it to develop a speed of up to 28 knots. In 1940, Italy entered the Second World War on the side of Germany, and the battleship becomes a participant in the fighting in the Mediterranean. After the end of World War II, the Italian fleet in 1946 underwent a division between the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition as a result of reparations, and in early February 1949 the battleship Giulio Cesare was officially transferred to the Soviet side and became part of the Black Sea fleet called Novorossiysk. The technical condition of the ship transferred left much to be desired. In particular, the battleship had no bottom protection, the third bottom was absent in the bow of the ship's hull, the battleship had no demagnetizing device, which made the ship vulnerable to damage by bottom non-contact mines with a magnetic fuse. In addition, it was required to replace the Italian guns of the main caliber with the corresponding Soviet-made guns. However, despite these and other design flaws, the battleship began to carry out combat service in the Navy of the USSR.
ON THE EVE OF TRAGEDY.
On October 28, 1955, after conducting maneuvering tests and checking readiness for artillery fire in open waters, at 17.30 hours the battleship Novorossiysk entered the Sevastopol bay of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet and headed to the anchorage site on barrels No. 3. Before " Novorossiysk "the battleship" Sevastopol "was moored on these barrels. This battleship was the same age as the battleship Giulio Cesare (Novorossiysk). For the successful fulfillment of combat missions during the Great Patriotic War, Sevastopol was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In July 1954, the command of the Black Sea Fleet decided to transfer the battleship Sevastopol to the class of training ships, and from November 1954 he was assigned a parking lot in the South Bay, anchored in barrels No. 13. The parking at anchor barrels No. 3 was secured to the battleship " Novorossiysk "and was located in the Northern bay opposite the hospital embankment.
At the approach of Novorossiysk to the anchorage, a command was given to give the left anchor and set off its anchor chain for a length of 80 meters. Battleship did not have time to extinguish the speed and slipped the bow anchor barrel to half of its body. I had to work cars back up and move back, after which the cars were stalled. Then the tugs deployed the ship in the direction of the exit from the Sevastopol Bay, and the stern towards the Neftyanaya Bay. On the bow anchor barrel, located on the right side of the ship at a distance of 20-30 meters from it, an anchor chain was built and fixed, and the stern of the ship was fixed with a cable to the stern , after which the anchor chain's slack on the port side was Selected. By 6 o'clock 30 minutes Novorossiysk was parked.
At 18 hours 47 minutes, it finally got dark, and visibility dropped to one cable (182.88 meters), but on a dark background of the horizon the battleship stood out clearly enough due to its on-duty lighting. Yes, and the moon was that night in the phase three days before the full moon, and from the cloudless starry sky, it almost like a searchlight, brightly illuminated Sevastopol Bay.  After the evening construction at 7 hours 00 minutes a small group of sailors, and some of the officers of the ship were dismissed to shore for a different period. The commander of the ship departed to the shore till morning.
In the parking lot of the battleship Novorossiysk, the silt covered the solid bottom of the Sevastopol Bay with three layers, differing in density and consistency. The clearance at the bow of the ship between the keel of the battleship and the first surface layer of the silt was 7.26 meters .
That was the situation at the place where the battleship Novorossiysk was anchored to the anchor barrels, when an explosion exploded on October 29, 1955 at 0130 hours. Despite the desperate attempts of the crew to save the ship, as well as to help from the emergency services that arrived to the site of the tragedy from neighboring ships, it was not possible to prevent the death of Novorossiysk. At 04:15, he turned over the port side of the keel up and in this position sank. The number of dead sailors and officers was more than 600 people .
On the day of the death of the battleship, the Council of Ministers of the USSR appointed a government commission to investigate the circumstances of the disaster. Three tasks were set before the commission: to determine the source of the explosion, to evaluate the actions of sailors and officers in the struggle for the survivability of the ship, to find out the reasons why the battleship turned over and sank. In the report to the USSR Council of Ministers, the commission indicated that the cause of the battleship explosion was the German bottom mine of the times of the Great Patriotic War. During the setting of the ship on the barrels, the anchor chain of the left-handed anchor of Novorossiysk touched the German mine and, therefore, triggered the mechanism of its undermining. The heroic efforts of the sailors and the duty officers of the ship were deemed adequate. At various stages of the tragedy, the top officials of the Black Sea Fleet, including the captain of the ship, arrived to Novorossiysk, but none of them managed to organize a single management of the rescue efforts. The ship's turn through the port side was possible as a result of a belated and ineptly attempted pull of the battleship in shallow water. In the report, the Governmental Commission also noted the shortcomings of the security system of the Sevastopol Bay, which did not exclude the possibility of penetration of an enemy submarine with saboteurs on board, but there were no signs of its penetration into the bay water area.
From the analysis of the materials of the investigation of the death of the battleship:
- the explosion occurred in the most vulnerable place of the ship - in the nose of its extremity under the bottom, which had no armor protection and the inner third bottom;
- on the starboard in the lower part of the bottom the ship received a hole, the edges of which are bent towards the inside of its hull; On the left side of the battleship, a longitudinal, concave dent inside of a substantial length was formed on the bottom without damaging the integrity of the metal of the hull; The nature of the damage received by the ship indicates that the explosions were underwater;
- the hole on the right and the dent on the left on the hull of the ship appeared almost simultaneously and independently of each other as a result of explosions of two charges located under the bottom separately from each other, respectively, to the right and left of the keel;
- Some of the sailors of the battleship, when questioned by the Government Commission, claimed that they had heard of a double explosion - two explosions with a very short time between them and different sound distinctions;
- in the area of the anchorage, in the first four-meter surface layer of mud, two similar funnels were found (the depth of the funnels is 1.1 meters and 1.5 meters, and their diameter is 10 meters and 12 x 14 meters, respectively, in the report of the foreman article 1 Yakovlev, who discovered the first funnel, said: "... I watched the dull funnel ... I believe that the nature of the funnel indicates that the explosion occurred somewhere higher, and the funnel was formed from the pressure of a column of water ..." ); Proceeding from the conclusion of an experienced diver and the dimensions of the funnels, it follows that both explosions were bottom; The charges differed in power and were at different distances from the silt surface;
- The first low-power charge, located on the port side of the battleship closer to the first silt layer, was intended to undermine the second, more powerful charge, to the right of the keel near the bottom of the ship. From the explosion of the second charge in the bottom, a hole of 150 square meters was formed, and then the carapace, armored and upper decks of the battleship, and also the deck of the half-tank were punched through;
Everything indicates that the battleship Novorossiysk was not killed by the explosion of a single German mortar during the Second World War, as reflected in the report of the Governmental Commission, but was damaged as a result of diversion with the help of two charges installed in its parking lot. Implementation of the diversion operation was facilitated by gross miscalculations and omissions in securing the protection of the bay. Nor can we exclude the assumption that one of the staff members of the headquarters of the division for the protection of the water area of the Sevastopol Bay, recruited by foreign intelligence, was involved in the sabotage.
SEVASTOPOL COCKPIT SAFETY SYSTEM.
The Sevastopol Bay had two lines of barrage to prevent enemy torpedoes or other objects from penetrating into its internal raid from the high seas. The first fence line (network), and the second boom line (bunk) had passages (gates) with a width of 140 meters. During the daytime the gates were always open, so as not to interfere with the entry and exit of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet when they performed combat missions or other tasks. In the dark hours of the passage in both lines of the fence were to be closed by nets through specially assigned tugs for this purpose. The entrance or exit of ships at night was possible only with the permission of the operational duty officer of the Black Sea Fleet and on the basis of the order for the fleet. At distant and near approaches to the Main Base, there were radar and thermo-direction-finding stations, posts of visual and other observation. Directly at the entrance to the Sevastopol Bay in front of the battle gates around the clock, the watchman was on duty at anchor in hydroacoustic control mode. This place had a symbolic designation on the scheme of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet as "point number 9". In addition, the water area before entering the bay was monitored by the shore noise control station, which also operated around the clock, except for the days allocated by the fleet order to carry out preventive maintenance on it. Theoretically, the security system of Sevastopol Bay looked like reliable, but in practice everything was different.
ACTUAL SITUATION IN SEVASTOPOL BOOK ON 28 OCTOBER.
The whole day on October 28 and until 02:30 on October 29, the gates of the boom network fence were opened.
On October 28, the radar stations near the capes of Lukull and Chersonese and the direction-finding stations at the cape Konstantinovsky and in the bay of Streletskaya did not work; On the same day from 08 hours and 40 minutes to 19 hours 00 minutes, the coastal noise control station did not perform underwater surveillance in connection with the routine preventive examination conducted thereon; Within 19 hours 47 minutes in the water area of the Sevastopol bay there was no hydroacoustic control .
The lack of hydroacoustic control in the Sevastopol Bay during such a long time is made possible by the archival materials presented in the book. Karzhavin . October 28 in the "point number 9" from 00 hours 00 minutes was sentinel ship BO-427 and carried a hydroacoustic watch there. But at 05.30 the commander of the sentinel ship received an order from the operative duty officer for the protection of the water area to leave the duty station. More BO - 427 on the "point number 9" did not return. The operative on duty had to send another ship to replace it, but did not send it, and when he passed the watch to his changer about the lack of hydroacoustic control of the bay, he said nothing. Only on October 29 at 00 hours 30 minutes the substitute was found that hydroacoustic watch in the bay is not conducted. At the "point number 9", the sentinel ship BO-276 was urgently sent, which arrived at the place of duty at 01:17 and proceeded to carry out the hydroacoustic watch. Exactly thirteen minutes later, an explosion occurred near Novorossiysk .
In this chain of events, the actions of the operative guard on the protection of the water area of Sevastopol Bay, who was on duty on October 28, are very incomprehensible. Is this his irresponsibility or his fully realized actions to neutralize hydroacoustic control? After all, it is quite obvious that after removing the control of the harbor's water area, all the ships in it were exposed to mortal danger that day, becoming the object of a possible diversionary attack. And such an attack really happened, and it's strange that only the former Italian battleship suffered. Accident? Hardly. It was a purposeful and carefully planned sabotage, and, judging by the choice of the object of attack, the nationality of the sabotage group is not so difficult to guess.
SOURCES OF DIVERSION.
After the division of the Italian Navy, which offended the patriotic feelings of the Italians, publications periodically began to appear in their media, the essence of which is that if Giulio Cesare does not belong to Italy, then it should not belong to anyone. This thought did not give rest to a certain circle of persons who were directly related to the fleet and had the opportunity and the means to carry out the sabotage operation that they had planned.
In 1951 in the Italian city of La Spezia, on the former training base of combat swimmers of the Italian Navy during the Second World War, the center for the training of underwater saboteurs was revived. It was based on people who took part in combat operations during the war as part of a special unit of naval combat swimmers. The main task of this unit was the destruction of enemy ships through their underwater mining. During the war years, combat swimmers have accumulated a lot of experience in sabotage attacks, they carried out successful operations in the Mediterranean (a night attack in the harbor of Alexandria by two British ships "Queen Elizabeth" and "Valiant" in December 1941 ). They visited the bay of Sevastopol during its occupation by German troops , and it was then that the Italian combat swimmers might well have had an opportunity to get acquainted with its underwater part and with a boom-network boom system that by 1955 had not undergone any changes . To carry out the operation to destroy the "Giulio Cesare" in Sevastopol Bay, the sabotage group selected the best. It is possible that all those selected gave a subscription to the lifelong non-disclosure of the task entrusted to them. Even those combat swimmers who were invited to take part in the planned operation, but they refused it for any purely personal reasons, could also give such a subscription.
If the issue of manning the diversionary group was solved quickly and easily, the technical side of securing diversion caused great difficulties. During the Second World War, man-torpedoes  and small submarines were used by the Italians to carry out underwater attacks .
The organizers of the sabotage decided that for its implementation it is most expedient to use a small underwater with a range of action that allowed it to overcome the distance from the coast of Italy to the water area of the Sevastopol Bay and return. With the end of the Second World War, the development of new delivery vehicles for underwater saboteurs intensively continued both in Italy, and in England and Japan. Even the US Navy has shown increased attention to this means of conducting combat operations . By mid-1955, new small-tonnage submarines had already been created and successfully tested in Italy. Unlike their predecessors of the Second World War, they had a long range (from 100 to 1,200 nautical miles), increased quietness of the underwater passage and speed in the underwater position to 6 to 8 knots. They could take on board from 8 to 13 naval saboteurs and transport at least two charges of a significantly larger mass . We also considered the option of transporting a small submarine to the Black Sea water area inside the ship, in a special chamber. In the neutral waters of the Black Sea, the chamber was filled with water, and through the sluices of the underwater part of the ship's hull, a small submarine went into the sea. After the operation, it was taken by the same ship.
By the beginning of 1955, a selected group of swimmers was almost ready for a sabotage operation. It remained to determine the specific date of its conduct. Organizers of the sabotage act were very tempted by the idea of launching an attack on Giulio Cesare on the eve of the celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution by the Soviet Union, and thereby preventing the participation of the Italian battleship in the parade of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet. But everything depended on favorable conditions of penetration into the bay of Sevastopol.
An agent working for the headquarters of the division for the protection of the water area of the Sevastopol Bay as an operational duty officer should have informed them about them. The operative duty officer had direct access to the scheduled preventive maintenance schedule at the long-range and short-range detection stations, to the schedule of exercises for the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, he knew the places of their parking in the bay, his job was to provide hydroacoustic control of the Sevastopol Bay. With this information, using his official position to obtain any other additional information, the "staff officer" determined the most favorable time for the penetration of saboteurs into the raid of Sevastopol, and reported it in advance with a radiogram. The radiogram was received by the ship-teller, who is in the Black Sea in standby mode, and from there the radiogram was redirected further to the destination.
The security service of the Black Sea Fleet constantly intercepted radio transmissions of ships, but almost 50% of radio intercepts were encrypted, and they could not be deciphered by the State Security Authorities. On October 27 and 28, five foreign ships were in the northern part of the Black Sea, 50 miles from the Sevastopol Bay, of which four were Italian .
ACTION BY DIVERCANTS.
Early on the morning of October 28 a submarine with combat swimmers on board entered the territorial waters of the USSR. On the same day, on the same day, the Italians spotted the battleship Novorossiysk, which carried out educational tasks in the open sea. At 1730 hours, following the wake of Novorossiysk, using the acoustic noises of its engines to secure it, the submarine penetrated the Sevastopol Bay, stopped its propulsion systems and waited for the battleship to be placed on anchor barrels No. 3. The distance from the surface layer of silt to the bottom of the ship was Sufficient for the safe maneuvering of a small submarine under the battleship. Through special locks of the boat, a group of saboteurs went into the water, released two charges of anchor type from the outer hanger of its hull. The use of the armature made it possible to establish a charge of high power as close as possible to the bottom of the battleship on its right side. A charge of less power, designed to detonate the main, was also anchored, but on the port side of the ship. The low-power charge was undermined by the clockwork mechanism, the time of which allowed the saboteurs to leave Sevastopol Bay in advance. The explosion was to occur at 01:30 on October 29. By this time, as the organizers of the sabotage expected, the agent in the headquarters of the division for the protection of the water area of the Sevastopol Bay will have time to change from his watch, and therefore will not be suspected of involvement in the subversive bombing of Novorossiysk. Further, the agent was given the opportunity to decide for himself, depending on the circumstances, either to continue serving at the headquarters, or to hide, using the turmoil and panic after the ship's explosion.
The nature of the strongest destruction on the starboard side of the battleship indicates that the explosion was narrowly focused. The narrow thrust of the explosion could be provided by a special design of the mine shell, in which the powerful explosive of the latest latest developments was placed. The front of the propagation of the detonation wave by the mass of the explosive was flat, and the tube form of the mine body additionally formed a directed output of the explosion energy.
An analogue for the development of the mines in the pipe corps by the Italians could well have been the Soviet anchor mine created in the USSR in 1935, and its subsequently improved model of the PLT-G , . The possibility of creating such a mine by Italian specialists for conducting a sabotage operation is entirely probable.
The Soviet mines PLT and PLT-G were installed from the submarine by their ejection through torpedo tubes, after which they occupied the anchor position according to the scheme given below .
But the Italian saboteurs installed their charges manually to successfully complete their mission. This method of installation allowed them, first, to compactly and accurately place them under the narrowed bow of the battleship. Secondly, to establish the main charge as close as possible to the bottom of the ship and in its most vulnerable place, of which they, of course, knew (it was the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare). Eight or thirteen trained combat swimmers did not make any trouble.
In its report, the Governmental Commission came to the conclusion that the explosion of Novorossiysk occurred as a result of an explosion of a German mortar of the times of the Great Patriotic War, type RMH, with a wooden hull, and equipped with a fuse M 1 , .
According to the commission, its explosion became possible because of the impact of the mine shell on the anchor chain of the battleship when it was being put on anchor barrels. As a result of the mine stroke, it was launched by the mechanism of its undermining that stopped in 1944. But the reason for the reason for such a long suspension of the mechanism, the commission did not submit.
The water area of the bay after the liberation of Sevastopol from German troops was trawled four times, especially in the places of future parking spaceships of the Black Sea Fleet. 130 times from November 1944 to November 1954 on the barrels No. 3, the battleship Sevastopol was moored, and from the beginning of November 1954 there it became 10 times anchored to the battleship Novorossiysk. The probability of hitting the anchor chain during the mooring time of both ships did not exceed 1.4%. Even if we assume that the massive anchor chain of the ship touched a mine, it would most likely completely or partially destroy its wooden case, and along with it a charge and a long-standing non-functioning detonation mechanism. Thus, an unexploded mine for 11 years, became permanently unworkable.
In addition, soon after the death of Novorossiysk, the command of the Black Sea Fleet undertook additional trawling of the bay. At a distance of 50 meters from the barrels No. 3, one German bottom mine of the Great Patriotic War times was actually discovered, but as it turned out, by that time it was already in an inoperative condition due to the self-discharge of its battery pack . Then why did not the self-discharge of the battery at the mine, allegedly undermine the battleship Novorossiysk? The mines were of the same design, with the same type of fuses and installed by retreating German forces at one time. The Commission did not give an answer to this question.
During the work of the Government Commission, serious shortcomings were revealed in the security system of the Sevastopol Bay from the penetration of an enemy submarine or saboteurs into it, which it could not conceal. Therefore, the members of the commission were forced to note them in their report and admit the possibility of sabotage against Novorossiysk, but they deemed it practically unlikely to implement it, without substantiating this conclusion.
But the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet after the explosion of the battleship immediately gave an order to search in the water area of the Sevastopol Bay enemy submarine . This fact unequivocally indicates that at the headquarters of the fleet they were sure that undermining the ship is a sabotage. Rumors of sabotage began to spread among the civilian population of Sevastopol, who gathered early on the morning of October 29 at the Hospital Quay after the news of the death of Novorossiysk. And only after the arrival of the Government Commission in Sevastopol appeared strongly enforced by her version of the accidental undermining of the battleship on an old German mine.
And what is even stranger in the investigation of the commission - it's just striking - why was not given an assessment of the actions of the operational duty staff of the division for the protection of the water area of the bay, who was on October 28, 1955. After all, according to his direct instructions, in the early morning, hydroacoustic control was removed, which after that was absent in the bay for almost 20 hours. The answer to this question is one, and without options - then the commission should have recognized that there was a foreign intelligence agent at the security headquarters of the bay, who intentionally removed her control and thereby ensured the penetration of saboteurs into it, and this would mean acknowledging a serious puncture in the work of the whole System for ensuring the security of the borders of the USSR. What would be the consequences for many leaders of the Navy (Navy) and the Committee of State Security (KGB) members of the Governmental Commission understood perfectly. They themselves were high-ranking officials, and therefore could not allow information about the connection between the actions of the duty officer and the explosion of the ship, spread beyond the limits of their narrow circle of persons. It is for this reason that the members of the commission categorically declared the bombing of the battleship on the German bottom mine, and the investigation of the catastrophe began to take place only in this direction. Convincing facts, unequivocally confirming the version proposed by the commission, was not found.
There is also no evidence of sabotage by the Italians against the battleship Novorossiysk, and, most likely, they will never be found and nobody will. If such an operation took place, then, certainly, the organizers of the sabotage act developed a large-scale and long-term plan for its cover. All those who were directly involved in the sabotage and those who somehow knew about the preparations for it, were obliged to remain silent and deny the possibility of conducting a sabotage operation. And is it not for this reason in the interview published in the book by A.N. Norchenko "The Cursed Mystery" , three former naval saboteurs unanimously asserted that the Italians had nothing to do with the undermining of "Novorossiysk". There are no grounds for believing their statements.
Means of foreign mass media occasionally published materials on the mystery of the death of the battleship Novorossiysk. More than once in their press appeared and still appear the recognition of the next "most recent surviving participants in the sabotage, who, before leaving for another world, wished to uncover the mystery of the death of Giulio Cesare , . All these confessions are often adventurous, and in their presentation they are of the same type. And most importantly, the statements of the "participants" contain such inaccuracies in the performance of the underwater operation in the Sevastopol Bay, which clearly indicate their technical ignorance of the sabotage attack, their ignorance of the elementary foundations of the sabotage case. With these statements, pseudo saboteurs inflict the most direct and cruel insult to the dignity and honor of the true combatants of the Navy of Italy of the Second World War, known for their highly professional training. For this they were secretly called "sea devils".
In addition to the version of the explosion of Novorossiysk by Italian saboteurs, there is a version of the ship's death as a result of British sabotage. However, why should the British blow up the obsolete battleship Giulio Cesare built in 1911, transferred to the Soviet Union for reparations, if for the same reparation the English Admiralty received a more modern Italian battleship "Vittorio Veneto", finally completed in 1940. This ship did not even leave Italy, because the British immediately abandoned it, however, with one condition - the Italians had to dismantle the battleship for scrap. What was done between 1953 and 1955 . Undoubtedly, the British submarine saboteurs in their training in no way inferior to the Italian combat swimmers, but they acted in the seas washing the numerous fjords of Scandinavia. No information about the underwater infrastructure of the Sevastopol bay, far from the foggy Albion, they had neither before nor after World War II. And as you know, without detailed knowledge of the combat situation, any sabotage operation is doomed to failure. And also, if the English trail were found in the death of Novorossiysk, then it is doubtful that in six months in April 1956 a visit of goodwill to Great Britain by the party and government delegation headed by N.S. Khrushchev. Nikita Sergeevich was a man of an irascible nature and very vindictive . Such actions against Novorossiysk, if they were undertaken by the British, he would not forgive them, and his reaction in this case would be quite predictable - no visit, only confrontation between countries and, of course, one must somehow revenge.
There is a version of OL Sergeeva published in the FSB magazine of the Russian Federation "Security Service" for 1996 : the explosion of the battleship Novorossiysk was organized by the special services of the KGB, with the sanction of the military and political leadership of the Land of Soviets and with the aim of removing the Commander in Chief of the Navy Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov from his position. This illustrious admiral with his ten-year plan to modernize the fleet greatly annoyed NS Khrushchev, who at the time was busy accelerating the implementation of his new doctrine of applying a powerful nuclear ballistic missile to a potential adversary, or a retaliatory strike against aggression. There was also a serious conflict between the Commander-in-Chief Kuznetsov and the Minister of Defense, Marshall of the Soviet Union, G.K. Zhukov. The chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, NA, was very disliked by the Admiral. Bulganin.
In May 1955, five months before the bombing of the Novorossiysk battleship, N.G. Kuznetsov suffered a second heart attack, was seriously ill, was on treatment at a sanatorium. Severe illness is a suitable excuse for dismissal. It was enough for the country's leadership to formally offer or unequivocally hint at the admiral's resignation on health grounds, and he, who has long been well aware of the situation in the military-industrial complex that has developed against him, would most likely agree to this. Moreover, after suffering a heart attack, the admiral himself asked the government to transfer him from the post of Commander-in-Chief to another job useful for the benefit of the Navy. However, the leadership of the country ignored his request , and did not even try to use it for the resignation of the admiral. Already only these facts convincingly prove the inconsistency of OL Sergeev's version about the involvement of the KGB in undermining "Novorossiysk" in order to crack down on NG. Kuznetsov.
Of all the existing versions of the death of the battleship, the most likely version remains the destruction of the ship by Italian saboteurs. The determining condition that made possible their penetration into the bay and, accordingly, the undermining of Novorossiysk is the removal of hydroacoustic control by the operational duty officer of the security headquarters of the Sevastopol water area. Such an act with subsequent inaction on the renewal of the hydroacoustic watch in the bay can be called treason. And who knows what the fate of this man was. Maybe after a shift from duty he managed to hide and was therefore never found, or maybe, on the contrary, on "hot" tracks, he was immediately detained and questioned, and to hide the fact that a spy was discovered at the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, He was quickly and quietly eliminated. Ends in the water, the commanders could sleep peacefully: no spies, no saboteurs; The culprit of the explosion was the German mine of 1944 release.
1. Karzhavin B.A. The mystery of the death of the battleship Novorossiysk: Documentary historical chronicle. - St. Petersburg: Politechnica, 1991. - 271 p.: Ill. ISBN 5-7325-0086-3
2. military.sevstudio.com S. Chennyk. Italian naval saboteurs in the Crimea
6. submarine-at-war.ru Anchor submarine mine PLT (PLT-G).
7. Norchenko AN Cursed mystery: [On the death of the battleship Novorossiysk on October 29, 1955] - St. Petersburg: Elmore, 1999. - 47 p .: ill. ISBN 5-7399-0046-8
8. amic.ru The Italian swimmer confessed to undermining the battleship in Sevastopol.
10. L. Mlechin. Khrushchev. Publisher: Palmira, 2016. - 512 s .: ISBN: 978-5-521-00114-9.
11. Journal of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation "Security Service", No. 3, No. 4, 1996.. Sergeev OL The catastrophe of the battleship Novorossiysk. Testimonies. Judgments. Data.
12. аrmy.armor.кiev.ua German naval mine RMH.
© Vasily Vladimirovich Sapozhnikov
August 31, 2016 - April 12, 2017